High Politics and Low Politics in Water Business

Global relations theory has long grappled using the conflict between the unilateral sovereignty requirements of states, and also the requirement for cooperation for transboundary transactions.

Because the flow of water does not respect political boundaries, it has been clear that regional management, at the watershed egree at least, will be a significantly more effective approach, at least from a management perspective.

Nevertheless, drinking water has frequently been "securitized," primarily because of internal politics, but has frequently had international repercussions. The question has historically been posed repeatedly, regardless of whether issues of regional drinking water means, regarded a "low" political issue, can be addressed in advance of larger, "high," political issues of nationalism and diplomacy. Both sides happen to be argued in the past.

The "functionalist theory" of international politics, an alternative to the fairly self-explanatory "power politics," claims that states will willingly transfer sovereignty more than matters of public concern to a common authority. Cooperation more than means, then, might induce cooperation over other, a lot more contentious and emotional problems.


In the Middle East, this thinking was the rationale for the extensive Johnston negotiations over a regional water-sharing strategy for the riparians of the Jordan River from 1953 to 1955; below President Johnson's worldwide program known as "Water for Peace," for cooperative assignments for immense agro-industrial complexes fueled by nuclear energy and desalination in the late 1960s; multilateral negotiations more than the Yarmuk River and also the Unity Dam in the 1970s and 1980s; and an attempt at a Global Water Summit Initiative including Middle Eastern participation in 1991.

It has also been argued that one require only wait for the cessation of hostilities before developing regional water-sharing plans and projects but that cooperation more than these projects may advance the pace of resolution of bigger problems: "A regional drinking water strategy need not await the achievement of peace.

To the contrary, its preparation, before a extensive peace settlement is attained, could help clarify objectives to become aimed for in achieving peace" (Ben-Shachar, 1989). Elisha Kally, an architect of many regional drinking water assignments in the Center East, has also contended that "the successful implementation of cooperative projects... will strengthen and stabilize peace".

In contrast towards the functionalist argument, realist critics respond that states that are antagonists within the "high" politics of war and diplomacy tend not to be able to cooperate in the realm of "low" politics of economics and welfare. Until the Arab−Israeli peace negotiations began in 1991, attempts at Center East conflict resolution had either endeavored to tackle political or resource difficulties, always separately.

By separating the two realms of "high" and "low" politics, some have argued, every process was doomed to fail. In drinking water resource issues - the Johnston Negotiations efforts at "water-for-peace," negotiations more than the Yarmuk River and the Unity Dam, and the GlobalWater Summit Initiative - all addressed water qua drinking water, separate from the political differences in between the parties. All failed to a single degree or an additional.

In the most detailed argument in assistance of the realists concerning Center Eastwater means, Lowi (1993) suggests that issues of regional water sharing simply could not be successfully broached within the Jordan basin until the bigger political problems of territory and refugees are resolved.

The Arab−Israeli Peace Talks with the early 1990s, however, were the very first time that both bilateral and multilateral tracks took location simultaneously. The design was explicitly to provide venues for problems of both high politics and low politics, using the premise that each might assist catalyze the pace with the other.

As Secretary of State James Baker, architect with the negotiating structure, described the relationship in his opening with the organizational meeting with the multilateral talks in Moscow: Only the bilateral talks can address and one day resolve the basic problems of territory, security, and peace, which the parties have identified as the core elements of the lasting and extensive peace between Israel and its neighbors.

But it is true that those bilateral negotiations do not take place inside a vacuum, and that the condition of the region at big will affect them. In short, the multilateral talks are intended as a complement to the bilateral negotiations: each can and will buttress the other.

Or, as Joel Peters describes it, "Whereas the bilaterals would deal using the difficulties inherited from the past, the multilaterals would focus about the future shape with the Center East". The multilateral talks included 5 problems of regional significance.

The only set which has survived the collapse of the peace negotiations and also the renewed violence of the early 2000s, and continues to function to this day, may be the Multilateral Working Group on Drinking water Means.